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INTRODUCTION 
uring the 2011 legislative session, the Oregon House of 
Representatives considered a bill that would create a new 
category of limited liability company (LLC) with a specified primary 
objective of furthering a charitable purpose.
1
 In so doing, Oregon 
joined a list of multiple states that have already passed or considered 
legislation creating this type of business entity, termed the low-profit 
limited liability company (L3C). The Oregon bill remained in the 
Business and Labor Committee upon adjournment of the 2011 
session; thus, the L3C form will not be entering the Oregon business 
landscape just yet.
2
 
However, as more and more states are adopting L3C legislation, it 
will be no surprise if L3C legislation is reintroduced in Oregon’s next 
legislative session.
3
 Oregon is home to a relatively high number of 
nonprofit organizations per capita; thus, the state will likely see 
sustained interest in L3Cs that, like nonprofit organizations, also 
further charitable purposes.
4
 As Oregon and other states continue to 
consider such legislation, the time is ripe to assess the benefits and 
drawbacks of the L3C. An effective analysis of the L3C is incomplete 
without looking at the promises of the L3C form as well as its ability 
to meet those promises. This Comment will assess the form’s 
promises in the context of private foundations, other investors, and 
allegiance to charitable purpose. 
The L3C has emerged in an era of change for funding of mission-
driven work. On one hand, the current economic recession has 
resulted in reduced giving to tax-exempt, charitable nonprofit 
organizations, key traditional actors in the mission-driven field. In 
fact, giving to these organizations fell by eleven percent from 2007 to 
2011.
5
 On the other hand, interest in socially responsible investing is 
on the rise: from 2007 to 2010, socially responsible investing grew at 
a rate of thirteen percent.
6
 The increasing interest in socially 
 
1 H.B. 2745, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011). 
2 H.B. 2745, 76th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011), Full Measure History, 
available at www.leg.state.or.us/11reg/pubs/hsemh.html. 
3 Infra note 10. 
4 See Number of Registered Nonprofit Organizations by State, 2008, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
CHARITABLE STATISTICS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/reports.php?rid=2 (last 
visited July 26, 2012). 
5 Giving Statistics, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm 
?bay=content.view&cpid=42 (last visited July 18, 2012). 
6 Sustainable and Responsible Investing Facts, US SIF, http://ussif.org/resources 
/sriguide/srifacts.cfm (last visited July 18, 2012). Socially responsible investing is a broad 
D 
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responsible investing parallels the L3C’s rise for good reason. By 
statute, the L3C can distribute profits but must also prioritize a 
charitable purpose, making it a particularly apt vehicle for an investor 
concerned with the ultimate impact of her dollar. 
However, the L3C cannot be understood solely in the context of 
mission-driven work. This new iteration of the LLC also emerged as 
one step in a broader effort to facilitate foundation investing through a 
mechanism called program related investments (PRIs).
7
 The potential 
of the L3C form lies in its capacity to leverage foundation funding 
with investments from socially conscious investors interested in 
accepting a lower rate return in exchange for an investment that 
furthers a certain cause, as well as market rate investors seeking 
standard rates of return.
8
 Through this tranched investment model, 
where different classes of investors accept different rates of return, the 
L3C could serve as a new kind of vehicle for mission-driven and 
charity work. 
Much of the current L3C scholarship and analyses focus on 
whether the form is a superior vehicle for PRIs by private 
foundations. This Comment looks at the L3C in the foundation 
investment context but also in the context of other private investors. 
Further, this Comment assesses the L3C form’s current ability to 
ensure enforcement of the primary priority of charitable purpose. 
While it is not the only piece of the puzzle, the enforcement of 
charitable priority is a critical aspect of the L3C’s ability to serve as a 
successful vehicle of impactful mission-driven and charitable work. 
Part I provides an introduction to the L3C through a discussion of 
the form’s potential and “promises” in three contexts: tax and private 
foundation investment, other private investment, and the broader 
promise of a new approach to mission-driven work. Part II examines 
the shortfalls of the L3C in these three contexts. In particular, Part II 
demonstrates that the current approach to the L3C form lacks tools to 
hold L3Cs accountable to the priority of charitable purpose. Part III 
explores a few ideas toward a more comprehensive approach to 
oversight, including a mandatory information return and specific 
 
concept that generally encompasses investor concern for the societal impact of an 
investment; it does not consist solely of investments in entities performing mission-driven 
work. Socially responsible investing is also referred to as mission investing, triple bottom 
line investing, or ethical investing. Id. 
7 See infra Part I.A. 
8 See infra Part I.B. 
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authority in an oversight figure or body. Ultimately, the viability of 
the L3C depends on the ability of scholars, practitioners, and 
legislators to see the form as a work in progress. Thorough analysis 
and bold creativity can contribute to the L3C’s impact as a form of 
business and as a vehicle for impactful, inspiring work. 
I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FORM: THE PROMISE OF THE L3C 
In 2008, Vermont became the first state to adopt legislation 
enabling the creation of an L3C entity.
9
 Following Vermont, eight 
other states have adopted similar legislation, and several others have 
or are considering similar legislation.
10
 Understanding the relatively 
fast rise and continuing momentum of this new entity requires a look 
at realities in the tax, investment, and mission-driven contexts. In 
each of these distinct contexts, the L3C promises to fill a particular 
niche. 
A. The Tax Promise of the L3C 
The best way to unpack the theory behind the L3C is to understand 
the PRI, a tax exception that allows private foundations to make 
investments that further their charitable purpose even if those 
investments might otherwise be considered too financially risky.
11
 A 
few key tax statutes and regulations governing private foundations 
shed light on the PRI. 
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) requires private foundations to 
meet certain minimum distribution requirements. A private 
foundation must distribute at least five percent of its assets annually.
12
 
Only “qualifying distributions” count toward this minimum. A 
qualifying distribution is an amount paid to accomplish one of the 
purposes listed in IRC section 170(c)(2)(B): “religious, charitable, 
 
9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (West, Westlaw through 2011-2012 adjourned sess.). 
10 In addition to Vermont, these states have adopted L3C legislation: Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming. Additionally, at 
least sixteen other states are considering or have considered L3C legislation, including: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, and Oregon. J. 
Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, 
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 nn.12–13 (2011). 
11 See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006). 
12 Id. § 4942(d)–(e). 
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scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
individual amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals.”
13
 In other words, a distribution, such 
as a grant, made for one of the section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes, can be 
a qualifying distribution. A distribution, such as an investment made 
for the production of income, is not a qualifying distribution. 
In addition to the annual minimum distribution requirement, the 
IRC also establishes standards to deter a private foundation from 
making risky investments. In order to avoid penalty taxes, a private 
foundation must not invest any amount in a manner that jeopardizes 
the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes.
14
 An investment will 
be deemed a “jeopardy investment” if it is determined that the 
investment threatens “the long- and short-term financial needs of the 
foundation to carry out its exempt purposes.”
15
 In other words, 
jeopardy investments are investments that are unduly risky.
16
 A 
jeopardy investment subjects the investing foundation, as well as any 
foundation manager who participated in making the investment, to 
excise taxes.
17
 
At the cross-section of these two regulations lies an exception: the 
PRI.
18
 If a private foundation makes an investment for the primary 
purpose of accomplishing a charitable purpose, then per IRC section 
170(c)(2)(B), that investment will not be considered a jeopardizing 
investment, even if it is financially risky.
19
 Moreover, such an 
investment will count toward the foundation’s annual minimum 
distribution requirement.
20
 In other words, the PRI exception is 
potentially very useful for a private foundation. It aids the foundation 
in meeting its annual minimum distribution, and it allows the 
foundation to invest in the accomplishment of its charitable purpose 
in a manner that might otherwise be considered too financially 
uncertain.
21
 
 
13 Id. § 4942(g)(1)(A). 
14 Id. § 4944(a)(1). 
15 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1973). 
16 Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy 
or Perversion? 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 255 (2010). 
17 I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1)-(2). 
18 Id. § 4944(c). 
19 See id. 
20 See id. § 4942(g)(1)(A). 
21 PRIs often include loans, loan guarantees, equity investments in charitable 
organizations, or commercial ventures for charitable purposes. Robert Lang & Elizabeth 
FLAHERTY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/2012  2:20 PM 
278 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 273 
However, the question of whether an investment is a PRI is not 
simple. The first part of this inquiry requires that the investment meet 
certain definitional elements. The primary purpose of the investment 
must be to accomplish one or more of the objectives described in 
section 170(c)(2)(B), such as a religious, charitable, or scientific 
purpose. The investment cannot have the significant purposes of 
production of income, appreciation of property, or accomplishment of 
one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D), such 
as attempting to influence legislation.
22
 While these definitional 
elements seem relatively straightforward, the second part of the 
inquiry is much more nuanced. An investment will only meet the first 
definitional element—that the investment must be made to 
accomplish one or more of the religious, charitable, scientific, or 
other section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes—“if it significantly furthers the 
accomplishment of the private foundation’s exempt activities and if 
the investment would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation’s 
exempt activities.”
23
 
Due to this strict inquiry, the burden on a private foundation 
wishing to make a PRI is relatively high. For each PRI, a foundation 
must consider its own mission, the mission of the recipient 
organization, the relationship between the two missions, and whether 
the governance and financial structure of the recipient organization is 
such that it will operate within the PRI definition.
24
 A private 
foundation’s failure to carefully undertake these considerations could 
result in an investment being characterized as a jeopardy investment 
rather than a PRI, thus subjecting the foundation and any participating 
foundation managers to the “toxic” tax penalties associated with 
jeopardy investments.
25
 As a result, when a private foundation wishes 
to make a PRI, prudence requires, at a minimum, an advice letter 
 
Carrott Minnigh, The L
3
C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 15, 16 (2010). 
22 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(i)–(iii) (1972). The purposes described in IRC section 
170(c)(2)(B) are “religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or individual amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty 
to children or animals.” IRC section 170(c)(2)(D) describes purposes of attempting to 
influence legislation or participating or intervening in any political campaign on behalf of 
any candidate for public office. 
23 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (1972). 
24 Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 891 (2010). 
25 Bishop, supra note 16, at 244–46, 252–53. 
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from counsel.
26
 However, an advice letter does not guarantee that the 
Internal Revenue Service will not reach a contrary conclusion and 
deem the investment to be a jeopardy investment. The only way to 
guarantee that an investment will fall within the PRI exception is to 
obtain a private letter ruling from the IRS, a process that is time-
consuming and expensive.
27
 As a result, many in the foundation 
community envisioned an approach to PRIs that lacked the 
burdensome process, and thus, encouraged more foundations to 
invest. 
The developers of the L3C concept sought to encourage more 
foundations to make PRIs by eliminating this investment-by-
investment inquiry, with the L3C form as a sort of pre-approved PRI 
recipient. To do so, the drafters of L3C state legislation modeled L3C 
statutes after the regulations that define PRIs, such that a foundation 
could make an investment in an L3C and assume that such an 
investment would be a PRI.
28
 The critical definitional requirements of 
the L3C parrot the same three elements as the PRI exception: (1) the 
company must significantly further the accomplishment of a 
charitable or other IRC section 170(c)(2)(B) purpose and would not 
have been formed but for that purpose; (2) no significant purpose of 
the company is the production of income or the appreciation of 
property; and (3) no purpose of the company is to accomplish one or 
more political or legislative purposes under section 170(c)(2)(D).
29
 
The matching language is only the first step: L3C proponents have 
advocated for legislation to “simplify the [PRI] approval process at 
the IRS level.”
30
 The aim of this legislation is alleviating foundations’ 
 
26 Id. at 258. 
27 See id. at 259. 
28 Robert Lang, one of the main individuals involved in developing the L3C concept, 
has stated that the intent behind the form’s design was to take advantage of PRIs. Robert 
M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and Mission 
Driven Organizations, in TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 251, 254 (Am. Law 
Inst. & Am. Bar Ass’n eds., 2007), available at Westlaw SN036 ALI-ABA 251; see also 
John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C 
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 122 (2010) (“Part of the impetus 
for the L3C was the unrealized potential of PRIs, the misperception that only sophisticated 
foundations could deploy PRIs, and frustration with the time and expense of pursuing pre-
approval of PRIs from the IRS—even though such pre-approval is not legally required as a 
condition of making a PRI.”). 
29 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (West, Westlaw through 2011–2012 
adjourned sess.). 
30 Lang & Carrot Minnigh, supra note 21, at 22. 
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hesitation to make PRIs by replacing the investment-by-investment 
inquiry with a “road map” that gives foundations “a chance to get a 
blessing by the IRS on the investment in a shorter period of time with 
less cost.”
31
 Specifically, L3C proponents have advocated for a 
rebuttable presumption that investments made in L3Cs will be 
considered PRIs.
32
 However, this legislation has not yet passed, and 
commentary from members of the Senate Finance Committee does 
not suggest a promising outlook: the Committee noted, “[w]e have 
not had any hearings on this particular matter and do not think that it 
is ripe for federal legislation.”
33
 At this point, this legislation, a 
critical component of the quest to make PRIs more accessible, seems 
like a long shot. 
B. The Investment Promise of the L3C 
An L3C’s ability to facilitate investment from private foundations 
through PRIs is only part of the equation. Another essential part of the 
equation is an L3C’s ability to attract private investments from 
individuals, including those motivated by charitable purpose and 
those seeking a market-rate return. In many ways, foundation 
investments and investments from individuals are mutually 
dependent: according to Professor Daniel Kleinberger, “an L3C exists 
to (i) receive foundation money through the PRI mechanism and then 
(ii) leverage that money with investments from for-profit private 
investors.”
34
 Of course, all investors are likely to come to an L3C 
with different motives and interests. Balancing those varying interests 
requires an investment model that provides adequate protections to 
each type of investor. 
Foundations seeking to make a PRI in an L3C will be concerned 
with the prioritization of charitable purpose. But when an L3C 
prioritizes charitable purpose, the organization is not likely to yield 
market-level returns. To facilitate a functional investment structure, 
L3C proponents have suggested tranching, where “investments are 
layered vested member ownership interests within the L
3C.”
35
 While 
 
31 Id. at 23. 
32 See id. 
33 G. Ann Baker, Did You Know?, 29 MICH. BUS. L.J. 5, 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/business/BLJ/Summer%202009/baker.pdf (quoting the Senate 
Finance Committee). 
34 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 884. 
35 Cody Vitello, Comment, Introducing the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company 
(L
3
C): The New Kid on the Block, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 565, 571 (2011). 
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L3C members can structure tranches as they wish, the L3C model is 
commonly discussed with three tranches: an equity tranche, a 
mezzanine tranche, and a senior tranche.
36
 In the equity tranche, 
private foundations make high-risk, low-return investments, most 
likely in the form of PRIs. In the mezzanine tranche, socially 
conscious investors carry a moderate amount of risk with moderate 
returns. In the senior tranche, market-driven investors carry the least 
risk and have the greatest return.
37
 In other words, when the rate of 
return is markedly lower, the investments of the equity tranche 
subsidize the senior tranche’s higher returns. 
The appeal of the properly-functioning L3C has attracted 
foundation investors to the equity tranche because their investments 
would be deemed PRIs. Socially conscious investors are attracted to 
the mezzanine tranche due to a promise of moderate return and the 
ability to fund a charitable project. Market investors are attracted to 
the senior tranche due to its consistent rate of return. The end result, 
in a perfect world, is an infusion of new capital for charitable 
purposes, investors whose interests and motivations are met through a 
funded charitable impact, and a particular rate of return. 
C. The Broader Promise of the L3C: Funding Mission-Driven Work 
The L3C’s escalating rise demonstrates that the PRI connection 
and the tranched investment model are only part of the story. 
Proponents view the form more broadly as a new approach to funding 
mission-driven and charitable purposes. Scholars and proponents have 
presented numerous perspectives on how the L3C fits in the bigger 
picture of mission-driven work in relation to traditional nonprofit 
organizations. 
A recent student comment suggests that L3Cs are a viable 
alternative to complex joint ventures between a nonprofit organization 
and a for-profit business, which are “often too complex to organize 
and manage effectively.”
38
 Due to the complexity of these ventures, 
one consistent challenge is clear outside recognition;
39
 essentially, 
this kind of joint venture lacks a recognizable brand. Thus, the L3C 
form serves as a branded, recognizable alternative between nonprofit 
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 568. 
39 Id. 
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organizations that face funding challenges and for-profit companies 
that must consistently earn a certain rate of return to attract 
investors.
40
 
Professor Linda Smiddy has placed greater emphasis on the public 
view of the strictly nonprofit and for-profit forms, arguing that a 
hybrid form such as an L3C may be able to avoid the pitfalls of both. 
The economic downturn has yielded a public dissatisfaction with the 
for-profit sector’s failure to focus on social responsibility. At the 
same time, economic challenges drive home the reality that nonprofit 
organizations cannot depend solely on charitable giving for 
sustainable funding.
41
 Thus, a hybrid form like the L3C serves as an 
alternative to the traditional nonprofit by allowing for-profit models 
of raising capital.
42
 As a result, Smiddy argues, social enterprises can 
attract investors seeking a return on their investment, but who are 
willing to accept a lower-than-market return rate due to their interest 
in furthering the company’s social mission.
43
 
These characterizations of the L3C form are marked by the view 
that the form fills a void between traditional for-profit and nonprofit 
forms. However, Robert Lang, a founder of the L3C movement and 
one of the form’s most zealous advocates, has implied that the L3C 
form should actually replace the traditional nonprofit in some 
circumstances. Lang suggests that the L3C “provides a vehicle for 
eliminating many nonprofits which are problematic and should reduce 
the proliferation of nonprofits.”
44
 At the same time, Lang argues, the 
L3C “provides for better utilization of foundation and trust funds and 
gives them a reasonable control of how their money is used after it 
leaves their hands.”
45
 Lang’s comments suggest that, in his view, 
there are too many nonprofits and that nonprofits do not allow for 
sufficient input and control from their funders, including foundations. 
In essence, then, the L3C could conceivably fit between the 
traditional for-profit and nonprofit forms or potentially serve as a 
replacement or alternative to the nonprofit form. Regardless of where 
the L3C most appropriately sits, its potential role centers on 
increasing funding for mission-driven work. The question is whether 
 
40 Id. at 566–67. 
41 Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in 
Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 4 (2010). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Lang, supra note 28, at 257. 
45 Id. 
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that funding is more likely to come from investors interested in 
returns and a social mission, or from foundations interested in doing 
more investing and possibly less granting. After all, private investors 
and foundations have different expectations associated with their 
investment. 
II 
WHERE THE L3C FALLS SHORT 
In spite of the promise and momentum behind the L3C movement, 
the form suffers from several shortcomings that detract from its 
potential. First, without explicit changes to the IRC, the L3C form 
does not replace the burdensome investment-by-investment inquiry 
required for PRIs, and thus, there is no tax advantage to a foundation 
making a PRI in an L3C over any other type of entity. Second, there 
is a significant lack of clarity around the functional utility of the 
tranched investment structure in the L3C context. Third, there is no 
viable mechanism in place for enforcing the priority of the charitable 
purpose in L3Cs. These shortcomings merit attention not solely for 
the sake of criticism, but because they can help guide the L3C 
conversation and lead to greater efficacy in the L3C form and its 
various enabling statutes. 
A. No Tax Advantage 
Perhaps the single most important motivating factor behind the 
development of the L3C form was facilitating an efficient route for 
private foundations to make more PRIs.
46
 However, without any 
change to federal tax law validating a privileged relationship between 
L3Cs and PRIs, the PRI process for an investment in an L3C is the 
same as the process for a PRI investment in any other entity. 
Professor Carter Bishop has given extensive treatment to that 
relationship, positing that “the ultimate utility of the [L3C] form 
uniquely depends on the resolution of the federal tax question.”
47
 At 
the time of Bishop’s research, as well as today, “there is no federal 
tax authority indicating that PRI determination will be satisfied 
merely by the L3C operation restrictions.”
48
 As a result, “there is no 
 
46 See, e.g., Lang, supra note 28, at 254 (“The key to the L3C is that it was specifically 
designed to take advantage of the [PRI].”). 
47 Bishop, supra note 16, at 245. 
48 Id. at 250. 
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reason to suppose that a private-foundation investment in an L3C will 
automatically qualify for PRI status any more than any other 
investment in any other entity.”
49
 The fact that the rise of the L3C 
form has not been accompanied by a change in federal tax law has 
two important implications. 
First, while an investment in an L3C certainly may qualify as a 
PRI, the PRI determination still boils down to an investment-by-
investment inquiry. Because this inquiry is still needed, Bishop 
argues, “private-foundation managers must exercise the same care in 
investing in an L3C as in any other LLC or entity, which requires 
either an opinion of counsel or a private letter ruling.”
50
 Professor 
Daniel Kleinberger has argued that because the case-by-case inquiry 
is an essential component of a PRI, the proposed federal tax changes 
would fail to address this reality. Included in proposed federal tax 
changes is a rebuttable presumption of PRI status for investment 
entities, such as L3Cs, approved through “safe-harbor” 
determinations.
51
 Kleinberger states: “the rebuttable presumption 
ignores the core of PRI analysis—i.e., the suitability of the investment 
vehicle, judged in terms of the particular purpose of the investing 
foundation, and the particular purpose and structure of the investment 
vehicle.”
52
 Kleinberger’s point may explain the hesitancy expressed 
by some academics and at least one legislator to codify the rebuttable 
presumption in new legislation.
53
 
Second, in addition to the specific inquiry still required for PRIs, 
some critics have pointed to another issue: the danger of L3C 
branding in spite of the lack of federal tax blessing of the form. 
Kleinberger opines that the presumed but unfounded link between 
L3Cs and PRIs makes the L3C construct to be “unnecessary, unwise, 
and inherently misleading.”
54
 The danger of branding in the context 
of a legal entity is that the form may give rise “to the delusion that the 
form actually does something, and ill-advised people may use it 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 267. 
51 H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Proposed Federal Legislation, AMS. FOR 
CMTY. DEV. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org 
/proposedfedlegislation.html. 
52 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 907. 
53 See David S. Chernoff, L3Cs: Less than Meets the Eye, 22 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 3, 3–
4 (2010); see also Baker, supra note 33. 
54 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 896. 
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believing that the form enables PRI treatment.”
55
 In addition to PRI 
determinations, Kleinberger points to an array of issues that could 
potentially result from a misleading L3C brand, including “conflicts 
of fiduciary duty for the foundation trustees, securities law concerns, 
and ‘exit rights’ for the foundation.”
56
 In light of these concerns, 
Kleinberger considers the brand “simplistic and dangerous.”
57
 
Whether the mere presence of the L3C form is as harmful as some 
critics have claimed remains to be seen, but one conclusion is certain: 
a foundation investment in an L3C is no different than a foundation 
investment in an LLC or any other entity, and such an investment 
requires all of the careful analysis and due diligence to prevent a 
jeopardy investment and the excise tax that follows. Suffice it to say 
that, at this point, the L3C form adds no value in the foundation 
context. 
B. No Structural Clarity 
The tranched investment model is commonly discussed as a strong 
possibility for L3C financing.
58
 However, using the tranched model in 
the L3C context conjures more questions than answers. The tranched 
model requires investments with varying expected rates of return.
59
 
One critical issue, then, is the feasibility of attracting investors at each 
tranche level. Professor Dana Brakman Reiser points out that the 
success of this model depends on “how large a slice of the investing 
public will be interested in a below-market financial return combined 
with the psychic value of investing in an entity pursuing a blended 
mission.”
60
 Any returns for these below-market investors and market-
rate returns for the higher tranche investors are predicated on private 
foundations’ willingness to “accept grant-like, near-zero-rate 
returns.”
61
 Even if an L3C can attract investments for the below-
market investor tranche and the foundation tranche, attracting the 
market-rate investors presents a different set of challenges. 
 
55 J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment 
in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 291 (2010). 
56 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 898. 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., Vitello, supra note 35, at 571. 
59 See id. 
60 Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT. 
L. REV. 619, 647 (2010). 
61 Murray & Hwang, supra note 10, at 22. 
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Most critically, market-rate investors may be wary of the L3C 
statutory prohibition on prioritizing profit. Reiser notes, “a tranched 
membership L3C must find a way to assure its targeted market-rate 
investors that their promised returns will be achieved when the entity 
is not being managed toward an ultimate profit goal.”
62
 Kleinberger is 
also skeptical about this feasibility, wondering “[h]ow is it possible to 
have a low profit limited liability company when no significant 
purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property?”
63
 In a stronger economic environment, an 
L3C might be able to convince its market-rate investors to overlook 
its statutory constraints on profit and its “low-profit” title. However, 
those points raise legitimate questions about an L3C’s initial ability to 
attract investors. 
Beyond the feasibility of the tranched investment model, some 
critics have raised questions about the propriety and even legality of 
subsidizing market-rate investment returns with below-market and 
foundation investments. Professors Murray and Hwang posit that 
below-market rate investors and the IRS will not look favorably on 
the tranched model, and that below-market rate investors “will be less 
likely to invest if it becomes evident that their funds are simply going 
to provide market-rate profits for traditional investors.”
64
 In the 
context of foundation investments, Bishop has also expressed 
concern, noting that the model “potentially violates the private-
inurement restriction” and “raises the specter of impropriety regarding 
whether the foundation is allowing its assets to be used to inure 
private benefit to the commercial or market tranche in the L3C.”
65
 
The private-inurement restriction stems from a private foundation’s 
exemption from federal income tax. As a condition to this exemption, 
no part of a private foundation’s net earnings may inure to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual.
66
 As Bishop explains, where 
a tax-exempt organization undercharges for the use of its assets, 
inurement can occur.
67
 Thus, a private foundation could potentially 
violate the private-inurement restriction if the foundation investment 
 
62 Brakman Reiser, supra note 60, at 648. 
63 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 909 (emphasis in original). 
64 Murray & Hwang, supra note 10, at 50. 
65 Bishop, supra note 16, at 265. 
66 I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 
2008). 
67 Bishop, supra note 16, at 265. 
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tranche is undercharging for the use of its capital.
68
 While most 
concerns about the tranched model are tied more closely to financing 
feasibility than to legality, these issues do hint at a significant 
shortfall of the L3C form: the lack of enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure charitable priority. 
C. No Viable Mechanism for Enforcing Charitable Priority 
Perhaps the most challenging question about the L3C form still left 
unanswered is that of the enforceability of an L3C’s charitable 
priority. This question presents a relatively new and unfamiliar issue 
because the only other entities that prioritize charitable purposes tend 
to be tax-exempt, charitable nonprofit corporations. Because 
charitable nonprofit corporations hold assets dedicated to charitable 
purposes, they are subject to oversight, usually by the Attorney 
General.
69
 The Official Comments to the Model Protection of 
Charitable Assets Act provide a relevant description of the nature of 
this oversight: 
The Attorney General’s duty has sometimes been described as the 
“parens patriae” power—the duty to protect the public interest in 
property that has been committed to charitable purposes. Unlike a 
private corporation or a private trust, no shareholder or private 
beneficiary has a financial incentive to supervise the proper 
management of the assets held for charitable purposes . . . under the 
common law only the Attorney General has standing to sue or take 
action to protect the public’s interest in charitable assets.
70
 
Like a charitable nonprofit corporation, an L3C operates for 
charitable purposes; however, an L3C does not operate exclusively for 
charitable purposes. While an L3C can legally pursue non-charitable 
purposes, it must always prioritize charity.
71
 Private foundations and 
 
68 Id. 
69 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 § 8 (West, Westlaw through 2012 ch. 141). 
70 MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 3, cmt. (2011). 
71 Due to the L3C form’s aspired links to PRIs, current L3C enabling statutes clearly 
articulate the mandated order of priorities. John Tyler, General Counsel for the Ewing 
Marion Kauffman Foundation, states that L3C statutory schemes are so clear as to leave no 
question as to the priority of purposes. Tyler considers the L3C fiduciary priorities to be 
“unambiguous” and finds these priorities to “[exalt] charitable purpose above all other 
purposes.” Tyler, supra note 28, at 141. Further, profit-related purposes belong “not just 
secondary on the continuum of permissible purposes, but near the extreme end of such 
continuum. Id. Tyler correctly points out the clear articulation of priority in L3C statutes. 
Identifying the priority, in reality, is not the challenge. Rather, the challenge lies in the 
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socially conscious investors will choose to invest in an L3C because 
of that organization’s dedication to particular charitable work. Private 
foundations will do so through the PRI mechanism. Socially 
conscious investors’ motivation to accept lower than market-rate 
returns is premised on their interest in seeing the charitable purpose 
carried out. In effect, then, L3Cs hold charitable assets of a kind: 
foundation and socially conscious investments are inextricably linked 
with an L3C’s charitable purpose. 
However, L3Cs may pursue other purposes, unlike charitable, 
nonprofit organizations. The critical issue then is identifying the 
proper and effective enforcement mechanism for L3Cs, which are not 
obligated to pursue solely charitable purposes. Scholars and 
practitioners have pointed to a number of potential mechanisms 
already in place that are aimed to ensure charitable primacy: the 
conversion of L3C status to LLC upon deviation from charitable 
primacy; the ability to provide enhanced voting power to the 
foundation tranche; and the utility of numerous traditional for-profit 
enforcement tools. Unfortunately, each of those mechanisms fails to 
produce a viable approach that safeguards charitable priority in L3Cs. 
1. Dissolution or Conversion of L3C Status 
As different states enact L3C legislation, legislators have taken a 
variety of approaches to the issue of prioritizing charitable purpose. 
Michigan and Wyoming each provide statutory authority for the loss 
of L3C status if an organization ceases to meet the L3C definitional 
requirements.
72
 In Michigan, the Attorney General is authorized to 
initiate an action if an L3C fails to meet the definitional requirements, 
including prioritizing charitable purpose.
73
 If the Attorney General 
finds that an organization is not fulfilling its stated charitable purpose, 
she has the authority to dissolve the organization completely.
74
 
Wyoming enacted similar legislation but places the oversight 
authority with the Secretary of State.
75
 If an L3C is not in compliance 
with the definitional requirements, the Secretary of State mails a 
notice and unless compliance is made within 60 days, the 
 
“[m]ore problematic . . . related matter of identifying processes and systems for ensuring 
accountability for faithfulness to that order.” Id. at 143. 
72 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4803 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2012, no. 297); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-705(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
73 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4803(1) (West 2012). 
74 Id. 
75 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-705 (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
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organization is deemed defunct.
76
 Thus, Michigan and Wyoming 
L3Cs are subject to government oversight and can be dissolved for 
failing to prioritize charitable purpose. 
Rhode Island’s L3C statutes do not explicitly grant oversight 
authority to a government body, but do suggest that the loss of L3C 
status is a possibility. In Rhode Island, an L3C that fails to meet the 
definitional requirements immediately ceases to be an L3C but 
continues to exist as an LLC and must change its name accordingly.
77
 
As such, Rhode Island’s statutes prompt the question: who has the 
authority to decide whether a Rhode Island L3C is operating in 
accordance with the definitional requirements? 
Moreover, the statutes in Michigan, Wyoming, and Rhode Island 
provide no guidance as to how an L3C’s adherence to the definitional 
elements, and thus, charitable purpose, can be regulated or gauged. 
Other state statutes that call for a similar outcome of judicial 
dissolution of an entity are triggered by events such as the failure to 
file an annual report.
78
 This type of event is easy to identify: either an 
organization files an annual report or it fails to file a report. 
Conversely, an L3C’s failure to meet the state definitional 
requirement of prioritizing charitable purpose is significantly more 
difficult to identify without metrics, guidelines, or processes. As 
Murray and Hwang note: “The mechanism and enforcement of a 
forced conversion from an L3C immediately to a LLC is unclear and 
potentially problematic.”
79
 Indeed, these “forced conversion” 
provisions seem rather toothless without an enforcement scheme. 
Further, what of the socially minded investors who invested in a 
particular entity in support of its “low-profit” brand and the priority of 
its charitable purpose?
80
 Because they lack an enforcement 
mechanism or a process for ensuring that charitably motivated 
investments will be honored or returned to the investor, the “forced 
conversion” provisions fall short of providing adequate assurance of 
charitable primacy. 
 
76 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-705(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
77 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-76(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 ch. 109). 
78 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 63.787 (2011). 
79 Murray & Hwang, supra note 10, at 31 n.164. 
80 Murray and Hwang also raised this question, advocating that “[u]pon conversion to 
or purchase by a profit-focused entity, the law should require the L3C to cash out the 
socially minded investors.” Id. at 51. 
FLAHERTY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/2012  2:20 PM 
290 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 273 
2. More Voting Power for Foundation Tranche 
Of all types of investors in an L3C, foundation investors have the 
strongest motives to hold an organization accountable to prioritizing 
charity.
81
 Professor Brakman Reiser proposes one approach where 
foundation investors would hold significant voting power in “matters 
of management or policy” and “other rights that would vest 
significant control over the L3C’s operations.”
82
 Under this approach, 
non-foundation investors would see a “corresponding reduction or 
exclusion of governance rights.”
83
 While it may be proper to endow 
this kind of control to foundation investors rather than to investors 
more concerned with profit, this approach raises at least two critical 
questions. 
There are several reasons to suggest that enforcement by the 
foundation tranche is not an adequate check on charitable priority. 
First, foundations may not be equipped or ready to engage in this 
level of involvement with an L3C: after all, if the foundation tranche 
has little or no expectation or interest in profits, it may not be 
motivated to apply a great deal of “rigor and efficiency” to enforcing 
charitable priority.
84
 Second, another concern returns to the issue of 
financing: market rate investors and even below-market rate investors 
are likely to be particularly wary of investing in an organization 
where they have no or limited voting rights.
85
 Without investment at 
each tranche level, including the market rate tranche, the model 
cannot function. Thus, relying on enforcement by the foundation 
tranche is simply not feasible as a sole approach to ensuring 
charitable priority in L3Cs across the board. 
3. For-Profit Enforcement Tools 
John Tyler has concluded that the multiple characteristics 
differentiating the L3C from charitable, exempt organizations tip the 
scale away from charitable enforcement mechanisms, vested in 
oversight authorities, and toward for-profit enforcement tools, 
generally vested in individuals.
86
 His position is premised on four 
 
81 Brakman Reiser, supra note 60, at 628–29. 
82 Id. at 628. 
83 Id. at 628–29. 
84 Brakman Reiser, supra note 60, at 651. 
85 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 
VT. L. REV. 105, 111 (2010). 
86 See Tyler, supra note 28, at 154. Tyler suggests three for-profit enforcement tools to 
ensure an L3C’s accountability to prioritizing charitable purpose: criminal and civil claims 
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distinctions between L3Cs and charitable, exempt organizations.
87
 
First, L3Cs can earn and distribute profits, seeking profit as a lesser 
purpose than the primary charitable purpose.
88
 Second, Tyler urges 
against perceiving L3C investors as lacking an “investor mindset”: 
L3C investors may anticipate below market returns, but will not 
invest funds “for the managers to use at their pleasure without regard 
to accountability.”
89
 Third, as L3C distributions and appreciation are 
taxable, “the government’s interest in enforceability is not driven by 
accounting for favorable, charity-based tax policy.”
90
 Fourth, because 
L3Cs can distribute profits, Tyler argues that they should be “fully 
submerged in the market economy and operate subject to its forces.”
91
 
However, Tyler’s argument fails to acknowledge certain realities 
about the L3C form that necessitate more, rather than the same, types 
of oversight as other for-profit forms. The pursuit of a charitable 
purpose and the pursuit of a profit-earning purpose are likely to 
conflict; in a decision-making context, the choice to do the most good 
will rarely be the choice that also yields the greatest returns. It is 
precisely this unique attribute of the L3C—the priority of charitable 
purpose coupled with the ability to pursue profit—that begs for 
metrics to guide decision-making and organizational analysis. Metrics 
are essential for socially conscious investors to assess potential 
investment decisions and for attorneys general and secretaries of state 
to know when to force dissolution of an L3C or the conversion of an 
L3C to an LLC.
92
 
 
for fraud and misrepresentation; vesting authority in the Attorney General to pursue 
members or managers for ultra vires act if they fail to properly prioritize charitable 
purposes; and piercing the veil of limited liability for deviation from ordered priorities. Id. 
at 156–57. 
87 Id. at 151. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 151–52. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 152–53. 
92 Such dissolution or conversion would only apply in states such as Michigan, 
Wyoming, and Rhode Island where statutory provisions create this possibility. See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4803 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2012, no. 297); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 7-16-76 (West, Westlaw through 2012 ch. 109); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-
705(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
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III 
POSSIBILITIES FOR AN IMPROVED APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT 
Due to the deficiencies in the current approaches to enforcement of 
the L3C charitable priority, the default statutory rules leave the 
blended mission of the L3C—priority of charitable purpose with 
profit allowed as a less important purpose—“essentially 
unprotected.”
93
 In light of this significant deficiency, and the fact that 
the L3C does nothing an LLC cannot accomplish, the L3C form may 
not be truly necessary. However, if the Oregon legislature or 
legislatures in other states choose to consider L3C legislation, it is 
essential that L3C enabling statutes include a proactive approach to 
the enforcement of charitable priority. Moreover, a clear enforcement 
mechanism would contribute positively to the L3C brand, 
“[improving] the L3C’s claim to a position as a home for blended 
enterprise.”
94
 The most effective approach to viable enforcement 
involves several tools. The first critical step to creating the basis for 
effective enforcement is mandating a publicly filed information 
return. The second critical step is naming an oversight authority, as 
exemplified by the statutory approaches in Michigan and Wyoming. 
A. The Limited Liability Company 
No discussion of improvements to the L3C form is complete 
without an honest inquiry about whether the form is, in fact, 
necessary at all. Professors Bishop and Kleinberger, among 
academia’s more vocal skeptics of the L3C, have premised parts of 
their respective critiques of the L3C on the idea that it is an 
unnecessary addition to state LLC statutes. Kleinberger notes that 
“there is nothing an L3C can do that cannot already be done through 
an ordinary LLC.”
95
 Bishop elaborates on this view, stating: “L3C 
statutory operating restrictions could be added in an LLC operating 
agreement or its articles of organization.”
96
 While the L3C form may 
have a branding advantage, “the statutory form carries no advantage 
 
93 Brakman Reiser, supra note 60, at 650. 
94 Brakman Reiser, supra note 85, at 111. One important example of this branding 
effect is the B corporation, another type of mission and profit hybrid entity. B corporations 
are required to undergo a certification and audit process through an independent body, B 
Lab. This kind of audit process provides some assurance to investors of mission impact 
and mission-motivated decision-making processes. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 60 
(providing  analysis of B corporations vis-à-vis L3Cs). 
95 Kleinberger, supra note 24, at 897. 
96 Bishop, supra note 16, at 249. 
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to similar contractual expressions in the articles or operating 
agreement.”
97
 Of course, an LLC operating agreement with strict 
provisions on the required priority of charitable purpose could, in fact, 
prove to be the most reliable means of ensuring charitable priority 
because it could be the most narrowly tailored. For example, an 
operating agreement could not only mandate that the LLC further a 
charitable purpose; it could also prescribe appropriate measures for 
the enforcement of that purpose. 
B. An Information Return 
If Oregon or other states do choose to adopt L3C enabling statutes, 
these statutes should include a provision requiring L3Cs to complete 
an annual information return, filed with the Secretary of State and 
available to the public, to supplement the annual report required for 
all LLCs.
98
 States could require L3Cs to provide some limited 
financial disclosures as well as information on how decision-making 
processes are structured to ensure charitable primacy. This kind of 
transparency would have at least three crucial benefits. First, it could 
give oversight authorities a tab on L3C charitable work. Second, it 
could provide current and future L3C investors with a metric on the 
impact of their dollars. Third, it could serve as a general check against 
charitable mission drift. 
An information return would serve as a critical tool for oversight 
authorities. Currently, most states with L3C statutes do not vest 
regulatory authority in a particular department or individual. Even in 
Michigan and Wyoming, where specific authorities are charged with 
enforcing L3C accountability for their charitable purposes,
99
 these 
authorities have no metric or tool for carrying out such enforcement. 
Without such a metric, regulating authorities will have little means or 
motivation to effectively assess the charitable impact of L3Cs, and 
thus, no clear way to hold an L3C accountable for prioritizing its 
charitable purpose. 
 
97 Id.; see also J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-
Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private 
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 291–92 (2011) 
(arguing that the L3C designation could be distracting and misleading). 
98 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 63.787 (2011). 
99 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4803 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2012, no. 
297); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-705(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
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An information return would also be an invaluable tool for 
investors. Regardless of whether an investor is drawn to L3Cs to 
invest for market reasons or charitable reasons, she will have a strong 
interest in understanding the businesses’ operations and impact. In 
order to empower investors to most effectively assess the impact of an 
L3C, a mandatory public disclosure is essential: the uniformity of 
such a disclosure would enable an investor to compare L3Cs against 
their peers. In addition, a mandatory disclosure provides a baseline to 
L3C investors and non-investor stakeholders, such as employees and 
clients, to determine additional disclosures and information they may 
want to seek. 
Finally, an information return would serve the invaluable role of a 
general check against charitable mission drift or skewed priorities. 
Ultimately, without such a check, the other stakeholders in an L3C 
will have little motivation to ensure that charity remains the primary 
priority in an L3C. Private foundation staffs do not have time to 
police the charitable impact of their investment. Further, other 
investors are unlikely to ask questions if they are receiving 
satisfactory returns on their investments. In such an environment, 
income could easily overtake charity as the primary priority. With the 
promise of an L3C’s charitable purpose at stake, a public information 
return adds a layer of authenticity and accountability. While the filing 
of a return is not a perfect check on an L3C’s charitable priorities, it 
certainly acts as a first step in orienting a business toward the 
nebulous question of charitable impact. Moreover, because L3Cs will 
be eager to attract investors who are drawn to charitable impact, it 
will motivate L3Cs to take these metrics seriously. 
There are already steps in place toward some kind of information 
reporting for L3Cs, making this approach particularly feasible. 
Proposed federal legislation includes provisions requiring any 
organization that receives a PRI to report on certain aspects of the 
PRI.
100
 Reporting requirements include questions on what the PRI 
recipients are doing with the investment, how the recipients are 
ensuring the PRI complies with the IRS rules, which foundations are 
making PRIs, and how often and for what purposes investments are 
being made.
101
 This kind of reporting is appropriate for all L3Cs, not 
solely L3Cs receiving PRIs. Even if an L3C receives no PRIs, this 
 
100 See H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 85, at 113. 
101 See H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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reporting would give the L3C’s current and potential investors a 
public metric for understanding its charitable impact. 
C. Explicit Oversight Authority 
In addition to mandatory information reporting, all state L3C 
enabling legislation should include an explicit recognition of 
oversight authority.
102
 This provision is a necessary companion to 
mandatory reporting as it would vest authority in a specific person or 
office to enforce reporting requirements and investigate or put 
pressure on an L3C failing to meet those requirements. 
Naming an oversight authority has multiple benefits. First, the 
knowledge of oversight would encourage L3Cs to produce reliable 
information returns under a statutory scheme that imposed such 
returns. Second, oversight would enhance the public’s confidence in 
making investments in L3Cs. Third, coupled with an information 
return, an oversight authority would lend a welcome air of legitimacy 
to the L3C brand. 
CONCLUSION 
As the field of charitable and mission-driven work continues to 
rapidly change, new and creative approaches that bring together the 
sometimes competing priorities of funders, organizations, and 
charities will not only be helpful, but necessary. While the L3C is a 
strong example of creative thinking in this arena, this type of business 
entity is saddled with disadvantages and uncertainty. Most critically, 
the L3C form’s promise of charitable purpose is not subject to a 
reliable system of enforcement. Without oversight or enforcement 
firmly in place, no adequate tools exist to hold L3Cs accountable for 
prioritizing their stated charitable purpose. 
If Oregon chooses to reconsider L3C legislation, it can set the tone 
for an approach to the L3C that helps to ensure a charitable priority. 
This approach also aids all stakeholders—including private 
foundations and other investors—in assessing charitable impact. By 
following the lead of Michigan and Wyoming and vesting oversight 
authority in a particular individual or department, Oregon can bolster 
the charitable credibility of the L3C form. Requiring an annual 
information return will further add to that credibility. With some 
 
102 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4803 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2012, no. 
297); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-705(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 budget sess.). 
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structure for oversight in place, the L3C form can better accomplish 
its promised ends: a contemporary approach to mission-driven work, 
an infusion of new capital in the charitable field from investors who 
have not previously been involved, and a renewed energy from 
foundations and donors who have long been champions of charitable 
work. 
